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Adam Scott Miller

A Watershed Event For a Watershed Community:
The Development of Flood Control for the Santa Ana
River Basin
BY ADAM SCOTT MILLER
ABSTRACT: Southern

California receives the vast majority of its
yearly rainfall in the relatively short time period between the
months of December and March. Occasionally, this intense
rainfall creates floods that have historically threatened and
devastated the communities of this region. The twentieth century
proved challenging for local flood control agencies. California
experienced tremendous population growth, resulting in migrants
settling on the existing floodplains. Unaware of the periodic,
hidden menace, newcomers were ruined when rivers and their
tributaries flooded. It became clear that a significant change in
flood control methods was required. In 1936, Congress passed the
Flood Control Act appropriating funds for flood control. The
Army Corps of Engineers took authority on flood control issues
and began investigating the best possible solutions to assist
communities like the Santa Ana River basin with the funds
Congress authorized. The Army Corps devised a plan that they
believed, at the time, was sufficient to protect Orange County.
However, in March of 1938 a major flood struck southern
California and demonstrated the need for a larger comprehensive
flood control program. Ultimately, the affect of this program was
the creation of immeasurable wealth for southern California.
Property values increased, as did property taxes. Land deemed
unusable because of floods could now be utilized. The creation of
a modern comprehensive flood control program greatly aided the
development of California’s economy—an economy which today
ranks 8th in the world. This is the story of the implementation of
modern flood control in the Santa Ana River basin and the
devastating storm that demonstrated the need for such
extraordinary measures.
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Southern California’s environmental faults are widely known;
these include prolonged drought periods, intense earthquakes,
destructive Santa Ana winds, and detrimental wildfires. Enormous
storms capable of producing floods seem to be the least of southern
California’s problems. In fact, if these disasters are ranked
thematically on the basis of concern today, flooding stands an
excellent chance of causing the least amount of anxiety for the
residents of southern California. Yet, if this question were
proposed 80 years ago, the flood nuisance would have caused the
foremost alarm and panic for the residents during that time period.
To prevent the annoyance of floods, the solution lay in updated
flood control projects.
Flooding was a way of life for the sparse population of
southern California in the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th
century, however, the Golden State grew in population to such an
extent that those affected by floods increasingly pled for help.
Because of rapid urbanization, it was difficult to maintain the
balance between nature and civilization, and the encroachment of
humanity into the floodplains was increasing. Policymakers were
forced to decide whether or not to appropriate funds to develop
long-term flood control projects. In a semiarid region, flood
control was only a concern when periodic intense rainfall occurred.
Flood control was viewed advantageously by most officials but
because floods only posed a temporary threat, the millions of
dollars required to develop flood systems was considered
impractical at that time. Additionally, not much was known about
the intervals at which flooding occurred. In other words, floods
happened unexpectedly and with varying strength; they could
strike two or three times in a decade or twenty years apart.
California’s lexicon categorizes floods into periods such as: 20year, 50-year, and 100-year floods. This means that, on average,
within those specified time frames a particular sized flood would
occur. The infrequent flood, like the 100-year flood, resulted in a
greater flood being produced than a flood that occurred during a
20-year interval. Because southern California covers thousands of
square miles and has a diverse topography, a storm’s intensity
could differ among the numerous regions within southern
California resulting in differentiated flooding. In other words, the
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Los Angeles basin could receive heavier rainfall than the San
Bernardino basin, causing a difference in flooding levels.
Southern California’s large, diverse regions made
implementation of flood control a complex issue that would
require unique solutions to each particular basin. Therefore, it
would be monotonous and tedious to discuss flood control on such
a grand scale, but a condensed perspective will establish significant
insight into the development of modern flood control. This paper
will focus on the Santa Ana River basin, which originates in the
San Bernardino and San Gabriel Mountains and continues through
San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties, and examine the
critical role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played in managing
and attaining flood works projects in a rapidly developing region.
Ultimately, a comprehensive flood control plan was approved,
providing a boost in usable land no longer subjected to floods.
This increased property values, which brought a great deal of
revenue back to the state in the way of property taxes.
The term flood control is synonymous with the Army
Corps of Engineers. To truly grasp the birth of modern flood
control a close investigative look is required of the Army Corps’
documents. At what point did flood control become modern?
Moreover, at what point did an aggressive approach to contain
flood waters occur? Often in history, a defining moment or catalyst
takes place that explains a sudden change in events. This
precipitating event took place in the month of March 1938 during
the Great Depression.
The 1938 flood happened at a crucial point in history,
bringing with it national attention and making the front-page
headlines in many states’ newspapers. In response to the
widespread devastation encountered by southern Californians,
Congress passed an additional flood control act directly benefiting
the Santa Ana basin. The 1938 flood effectively redefined flood
control in southern California. After the flood it was imperative
that the flooding be managed, not only to protect the citizens of
southern California, but for economic reasons.
This paper will show that the Army Corps of Engineers
played a vital role in the design of flood control and persuaded
lawmakers that short-term appropriations for flood works projects
would result in long-term savings. It will further argue that
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modern flood control was seen as an investment for the
government. Flood control is a complex issue, spanning thousands
of square miles and affecting different basin regions. The limited
scope of this paper will be confined to analyzing flood control
efforts in the Santa Ana River region, which includes the Inland
Empire and Orange County.
To comprehend the subject matter, a quick lesson in the
history of California’s flooding problem prior to 1938 will be
useful, as well as an overview of the role the Army Corps of
Engineers played—and still plays—in society. From that point the
paper will focus on events prior to the 1938 flood, then discuss
why the 1938 flood changed perceptions and led to modernized
flood control. Thereafter, the paper will delve into the construction
advancements that took place after 1938, and then reveal the
subsequent land-use benefits of flood control. The implementation
of a comprehensive flood control system is critical to explaining
the development of southern California’s shift from an agricultural
to industrial-based economy and the subsequent creation of
incredible wealth within the region.
Geographic Background
Flooding occurs in southern California because of an uneven
landscape. From the coastline, headed inland, the terrain gradually
slopes upwards until reaching the transverse mountain ranges,
which encompass the region and, thus, create a basin. In a mere
70-mile distance, the elevation soars from sea level to peaks of
over 10,000 feet. The two most prominent mountain ranges
affecting the Santa Ana basin are the San Bernardino and San
Gabriel Mountain range. The San Bernardino Mountain range’s
maximum height, at San Gorgonio peak, reaches 11,503 feet
(3,506 meters). West of the San Bernardino Mountains are the San
Gabriel Mountains. The highest point is at San Antonio’s peak,
also referred to as Mt. Baldy, at 10,068 feet (3,069 meters). The
picture below gives an excellent example of the Los Angeles basin.
The San Gabriel Mountains reach to the far right of the picture
cutting off the San Bernardino Mountain range.
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Figure 1. Enhanced Satellite Photo from Jet Propulsion Laboratories (JPL)
depicting steep transverse mountain ranges in comparison to the relatively flat
land of southern California.

Nevertheless, the enhanced satellite image, as a visual aid,
illustrates the formation of a basin in relation to steep mountain
ranges. Notice the Los Angeles River right of center next to the
L.A. Harbor as it makes its way to the San Gabriel Mountains and
the Santa Ana River at the far right. High elevations allow the
water to run off quickly and then form natural waterways. These
waterways or tributaries converge to form rivers like the Santa Ana
and Los Angeles River. Much like the ancient expression, “All
roads led to Rome,” all the Inland Empire’s tributaries lead to the
Santa Ana River, making it a formidable and potent river when
heavy rain occurred.
Tributary Problems
When addressing flood control, the Civil Works project focuses on
both the mainstream and lesser tributaries. For example, the Prado
Dam, completed in 1941, is located at a choke point on the Santa
Ana River, which restricts and minimizes water flow reaching into
Orange County. The Santa Ana River acts as an artery for water.
It is a combination of all the water collected from its tributaries.
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However, it is not the only factor contributing to regional floods.
Flooding affects regions miles away from the Santa Ana River.
Tributaries are the veins of the Santa Ana River and also unleash
havoc on local residents. Case in point, the San Timoteo Creek is a
tributary to the Santa Ana River. The two converge near the I-10
and I-215 freeways in the city of San Bernardino. Even within the
San Timoteo Creek other creeks converge on it like Wilson and
Wildwood Creek. When the region experiences heavy rainfall the
San Timoteo Creek overflows its banks and/or undermines
manmade levees, which leaves the residents of Loma Linda and
surrounding communities in turmoil. The photograph below
depicts a large wave as it approaches the Anderson Street Bridge in
Loma Linda during the February 1969 floods.1

Figure 2. Flood of February 1969. “Wave action approaching Anderson Street
Bridge” in Loma Linda, CA

The example of the San Timoteo Creek illustrates how dispersed
flooding can happen. Floods are not confined to just the main river
flow, but can also occur in the vicinity of the tributary. Therefore,
a comprehensive flood control plan needs to recognize and
undertake projects for both the mainstream and tributary
waterways in order to reduce the risk of floods.
1

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District, Flood Plain Information:
San Timoteo Creek, Vicinity of Loma Linda San Bernardino County California,
June 1973. Prepared for San Bernardino County Flood Control District, 35.
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Southern California’s Population and Flood History
Southern California’s population began to change after 1900. Only
93,000 people lived in California just after the state gained
admission to the union in 1850. A half-century later that number
rose to 1.5 million and by 1960 almost 16 million people called
California their home.2 The 1920’s became a pivotal point for
population in southern California. The state’s population grew by
2 million during that decade. Most new migrants headed for
southern California because of new employment opportunities in
filmmaking, shipping, and manufacturing.3 Southern California
saw another wave of migrants in the 1930’s and 1940’s as well.
The Dust Bowl perpetuated the displacement of Midwest farmers
in 1930’s and over a million came to find work in the fertile
agricultural lands of California.4 The Pacific Front in World War
II brought an abundance of vital defense industry jobs to help in
the war effort. Out-of-work citizens throughout the country were
attracted to these new opportunities. Even after the war, the
defense industry beckoned newcomers to the state in search of
prosperity.5 In 1970, the census confirmed that California’s
population overtook New York as the largest in the union.6 The
state’s tremendous population growth required officials to
reexamine flood control. As the population soared so did new
housing, businesses, and other means of infrastructure to support
an urban sprawl. This unprecedented growth meant more people
and property were endangered when periodic flooding occurred.
Prior to the 1938 flood, the 1916 flood showed the disastrous
effects of a population encroaching on the flood plains.
The January 1916 flood was the first large event in the
twentieth century for the Santa Ana River basin. Two separate
storm systems each produced six consecutive, intensive days of
2

Larry N. Gerston and Terry Christensen, California Politics and Government:
A Practical Approach. Ninth ed., (Belmont, CA: Clark Baxter, 2007), 6.
3
Gerston and Christensen, 6.
4
Gerston and Christensen, 6.
5
Gerston and Christensen, 7.
6
James D. Hart, A Companion to California (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987), 397.
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rain that month. In total, January 1916 had 19 days of rain.7 In the
Santa Ana basin rainstorms of high intensity for short durations of
time caused severe flooding. In 1916, according to the U.S.
Weather Bureau, 16.71 inches of rain in a 24-hour period was
recorded at a small hotel, named the Squirrel Inn, located near the
crest of the San Bernardino Mountains. The concentrated rainfall
received at the Squirrel Inn demonstrates the tremendous
magnitude of some southern California storms.8 Such intense
rainfall swiftly descends to the base of the mountain and drains
into the already-enlarged Santa Ana River. Furthermore, the total
amount of water runoff is concentrated to a maximum of 20 square
miles of drainage area, thus creating a flood.9 Even natural lakes
such as Lake Elsinore overflowed.10 According to the Army Corps
the magnitude of a 1916 flood happened only once in every 30
years’ time.11 The total monetary loss due to the 1916 flood was
estimated at $7,580,000 million.12 Four people in Orange County
succumbed to the flood; in addition, five bridges were destroyed,
electric and telegraph services were interrupted, and a gas line
broke at the Chapman Street Bridge.13 In other regions, railroad
tracks, roads, homes, and orange groves washed away. Ontario,
Redlands, Anaheim, and other communities remained isolated; the

7

Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 7;
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosures 1-8, 11-1-46; Records on the Office of the
Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District Survey Reports 1935-1979, box 161;
Record Group 77; Nation Archives Pacific Region, Perris, CA (hereafter RG 77,
NARA).
8
Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15,
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.”, 4; Santa Ana
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA
9
Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 3.
10
“Flood Control,” page 15; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939
[1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA.
11
“Flood Control”, 20.
12
Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 12;
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosures 1-8, 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA.
13
“Orange County Flood Control Report,” 4; Santa Ana River + other streams,
CA 1937 (ENCL.) [3/5]; box 505; RG 77, NARA.
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flood eliminated all means of communication and transportation.14
Disneyland, referred to as, “the happiest place on earth” would
simply not exist in Anaheim if flooding persistently devastated the
city. The picture below is an example of how the population coped
with flooding.

Figure 3. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
“Evacuating the Mexican quarter, 4th and Artesia, Santa Ana, CA.”

The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
The Army Corps of Engineers plays a vital role managing Federal
mandated projects, tracing their roots back to Chief Engineer
Colonel Richard Gridley. In 1775, Colonel Gridley oversaw the
fortifications for the Battle of Bunker Hill during the American
Revolution.15 The Corps’ function has significantly increased over
time. The Corps’ primary focus was designing military
fortifications, such as Bunker Hill and Fort McHenry, but
gradually their responsibilities expanded in the newly developing
nation.16 In the nineteenth century, the Army Corps continued to
build fortifications, but also began surveying roads, canals, and the
14

Colonel R.C. Hunter, Chief Engineer Los Angeles, 11/1/1946, “Report of
Survey of Santa Ana River and Tributaries, California, for Flood Control,” 7;
Santa Ana River (CA) SR Enclosure 1-8 11-1-46; box 161; RG 77, NARA.
15
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History 2nd Edition, U.S. (Alexandria,
Virginia: Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, 1998), 1.
16
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History, vi.
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western frontier. They oversaw the design and construction of
monuments and buildings in the nation’s capitol.17 In the twentieth
century, especially after World War II, the Army Corps turned
their attention to non-defense activities focusing, for example, on
shoreline projects. They engineered and improved major shipping
harbors, in addition to smaller harbors used for pleasure craft.
Developing harbors drastically changed the function of the Army
Corp of Engineers.18 As a federal agency, the Army Corps’
primary focus was for the benefit of the nation. Therefore, it was
involved in the construction of interstate projects such as navigable
waterways—not state and local projects, such as marinas.
However, in 1932 Congress amended the River and Harbor Act of
1902 to include the phrase, “’the use of waterways by seasonal
passenger craft, yachts, house boats, fishing boats, motorboats and
similar craft whether or not operated for hire.’”19 Slowly, the
Corps’ authority reached to localized areas within a state, and was
no longer restricted to projects spanning state lines where
jurisdiction problems could occur. The Army Corps steadily
became the federal government’s authority on water, taking the
responsibilities out of state and local hands. From building
harbors, marinas, and dams it would only be a matter of time
before the Army Corps added flood control to their extensive
resume.
In 1936 Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which
authorized the federal government to take responsibility for flood
control activities.20 Instead of creating a new agency on flood
control, Congress assigned the Secretary of War, who oversees the
Army Corps of Engineers, to the task of building flood control
structures. The Act appropriated $320 million for 250 projects and
surveys throughout the nation to boost the national economy.21 For
the people living in the Santa Ana River basin, this meant help was
on the way.
When the Army Corps began their investigation of the
Santa Ana River basin, they quickly discovered the “deficiency” of
17

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History, iii.
Turhollow, 77.
19
Turhollow, 77.
20
Army Corps of Engineers: A History, 247.
21
Army Corps of Engineers: A History, 247.
18
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information compiled by local officials on the behavior of flooding
rivers and tributaries.22 In essence, the Army Corps started from
scratch without any previous knowledge of how much water
flowed at a given point in the waterways. In March of 1938, the
Army Corps of Engineers was coincidentally blessed when they
received their immense study case: a rare 100-year flood. From
that point on, the Army Corps took the lead role in a progressive
flood control effort. Today, according to the Army Corp of
Engineers, “[their] mission areas include planning, designing,
building, and operating water resources and other civil works
projects… providing immediate and long-term support to the
public during natural disasters and national emergencies.”23 Thus,
the Army Corps emerged as an authority on waterworks projects
and continues to maintain their presence as a principal engineering
organization in this field.
The past acts as a window to the future allowing us to
compare floods to one another. A storm’s intensity is always
variable and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to when another
large flood will occur. In that regard, floods are very much like
earthquakes. Therefore, it is important for researchers to identify
which flood was historically the largest, not necessarily in terms of
the most destruction, but which flood created the most discharge of
water. Identifying this flood will give the Army Corps of
Engineers a benchmark so they can, in turn, develop flood control
to meet that point of reference.
In an effort to better understand California’s past flooding
the Army Corps began looking at prior reports delineating the
different floods. They turned to a report compiled on September
21, 1931 named “Big Tujunga Creek” written by consulting
engineer Franklin Thomas.24 The records indicated that 34 floods
occurred in a period of 168 years, giving an average expectancy of
one flood occurring in southern California every five years.25 The
historical data Thomas used for his report was previous rainfall
22

Army Corps Los Angeles District, “Flood Control,” page 53; Santa Ana
River, CA Flood Control July 1939 [1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA.
23
Army Corps of Engineers: A History, iii.
24
Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939 [1/2];
box 160; RG 77, NARA.
25
Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939.
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records, Mission Priests’ reports, and notes in explorers’ diaries.26
The data also indicated that the flood of 1861-62 was considered to
be the greatest flood on record. A chart created by the San
Bernardino County Flood Control District analyzes past floods by
the amount of water that discharged through a place known as the
Riverside Narrows. The graph, below, clearly illustrates the 186162 flood as being “off the chart” compared to other floods. In
addition, the 1862 flood had three times more water discharge
through the Riverside Narrows than the 1938 study case.

Figure 4. The chart represents past discharge rates of water on the Santa Ana
River at the Riverside Narrows location.

The primary question arising from using this chart is: How were
these measurements gathered in 1862? First hand witnesses wrote
what they experienced during the flood:
There were billows 50 feet high. The waters from
the vast drainage area found themselves forced
26

Survey Report, page 45; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control July 1939.
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abruptly into a narrow channel, and just above Agua
Mansa the river filled the valley from bluff to bluff,
reaching the little church. Father Borgoatta, then
the pastor, heard the roar in the distance, rang the
bell frantically and the people fled to high ground.
Some of the last ones had to swim.
For scientists, the crucial part of the text is the description of the
Santa Ana’s water flow reaching the “little church.” The church’s
location was known when the Army Corp compiled their data. To
legitimize the story about the little church the Corps retrieved
helpful information from Mr. Celso Robidoux, grandson of Louis
Robidoux, an early settler of Riverside.27 In fact Louis Robidoux
purchased the region known as Jurupa from a man named Don
Benito Wilson between 1846-1848.28 Wilson, an early
pioneer/mountain man, helped develop and soon became the
second mayor of Los Angeles. The land he sold to Louis Robidoux
was named Rancho Jurupa, part of greater Riverside, located in
and around the city of current day Rubidoux and the location of
Agua Mansa Mission, where the little church of San Salvador
lay.29 30 The Corps’ documents state Mr. Celso Robidoux:
Accompanied engineers to the site of Agua Mansa
Mission and identified landmarks which had been
pointed out to him in childhood by his parents,
which then showed evidences of the 1862 flood. He
corroborated the high water level which of that
flood at Agua Mansa as determined from other
sources by the Advisory Committee on Flood
Control in San Bernardino County, and told of the
sweeping away of settlements and cultivated lands,
evidences of which he saw in his boyhood. The
peak discharge of Santa Ana River at Agua Mansa,
27

Tab 23, page 2; Santa Ana River+ tribs, (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; RG 77,
NARA.
28
Nat B. Read, From Mountain Man to Mayor: Don Benito Wilson Los
Angeles 1841 to 1878. (Santa Monica: Angel City Press, 2008), 40.
29
Read, 40.
30
Report, “History of Past Floods Santa Ana basin, Feb. 15, 1939, tab 23 page
2; Santa Ana River + tribs., CA 1939 (ENCL.) [1/5]; box 508; RG 77, NARA.
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computed by engineers of the agency referred to
above, was 338,000 c.f.s. on January 22, 1862.31
Other first-hand accounts gathered by the Army Corps for their
report describe the following:
In the town of Anaheim, four miles from the river,
the water ran four feet deep and spread in an
unbroken sheet to the Coyote hills, three miles
beyond. The inhabitants sought safety in the second
stories of their houses, and those who were not
fortunate enough to have an upper story quartered
themselves upon those who had. One unfortunate
was carried down by the current and drowned.32
The above story mentions that the floodwater was four feet deep
four miles away from the Santa Ana River. The magnitude of this
flood sounds astonishing, almost unbelievable to those that had not
experienced a large flood. The March flood would legitimize these
incredible stories. The rain that produced this flood started on
December 25, 1861 and continued for 25 consecutive days, ending
on January 18, 1862.33 The information the Army Corps of
Engineers acquired from a reliable source about the 1861-62 flood
establishes the benchmark that flood control structures would need
to withstand.
The above graph is also helpful when analyzing the
outcomes of the 1938 flood; a flood that was pivotal in
determining the levels of flood control necessary in southern
California. For example, no other flood after 1938 is equivalent in
water discharge, but three floods prior to 1938 were equal or
greater than the 1938 flood at the measurements taken at the
Riverside Narrows. This comparison illustrates how the old
system of flood control became outdated and a new “modern”
31

As a comparison, the Columbia River on the boarder of Washington and
Oregon flows at a rate of 225,000 c.f.s. (cubic feet per second).
32
Report, “History of Past Floods Santa Ana basin, Feb. 15, 1939, 3.
33
San Bernardino County Flood Control History,
http://www.sbcounty.gov/dpn/floodcontrol/history.asp (accessed on January 5,
2010).
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approach was implemented, making a difference in the graph.
These changes were necessary since a significant population
growth was occurring in California.
With a general understanding of the cosmetic makeup of
southern California and past flooding history, in addition to
comprehending the function of the Army Corps of Engineers, this
paper will narrow its scope to examine the flooding events prior to
1938 and analyze the Army Corps’ study on the Santa Ana River
basin. The Army Corps gathered evidence to demonstrate the
benefits of flood control in the Santa Ana River basin. By no
means does this paper suggest that flood control never existed in
southern California. In fact, local agencies attempted to subdue
and channel water runoff for more than 80 years prior to 1937.34
They built, maintained, and improved channels from time to time
in order to manipulate the flow of water caused by seasonal rain
for drinking and irrigation purposes. Despite these efforts, on
occasion the flood menace struck and overwhelmed the manmade
devices, crippling the swelling communities. The Army Corp
classified these existing flood control structures to withstand floods
of five to eight year intervals.35 Not until Congress authorized the
federal government to finance flood control projects did the Army
Corp of Engineers intercede on existing flood problems to find
long-term comprehensive solutions for the benefit of the cities,
states, and the nation.
Flood Control Before the March 1938 Flood
When the Army Corps of Engineers began their investigation into
flood control in 1937 they asked district flood control agencies to
compile reports explaining how they perceived flood control and
the flood menace. Flood Control Engineer for Orange County M.
N. Thompson wrote such a report for the County Board of
34

Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15,
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., page 10; Santa Ana
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA.
35
Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 9.
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Supervisors and the Army Corps. His report reverted back to the
impacts of the 1916 flood and stressed the future impacts on the
Orange County area:
Since 1916 the development of the District has
proceeded at a rapid rate. The population has more
than doubled the assessed valuation [(property
values)] has increased more than 300%. More than
half the present inhabitants have no personal
knowledge of the area that would be overflowed or
the resulting damage. Intense cultivation, brought
about by high returns from citrus fruits and other
crops, has extended to land where flood waters once
had the opportunity of spreading without causing
much damage…The financial losses that would
result under the present conditions, from a flood
similar to that of 1916 would not only cause
hardship to owners and residents of the lands and
improvements directly concerned, but would affect
the County as a whole. Funds for the repair of flood
damaged public property must come from taxes,
and to make up the deficiency in tax returns from
private property, reduced in value from flood
damage, the tax rate on other property of the County
must necessarily be increased.36
Exponential population growth in southern California was the core
problem according to Chief Engineer Thompson’s report. A
flood’s increasing capability of causing destruction is linked
directly to the upsurge of population. With every new flood, the
damage becomes more severe and costly to southern Californians.
For example, an Army Corps’ report reiterates these facts by
providing additional evidence:
The flood damage measured in dollars has increased
somewhat out of proportion to the severity of the
36

M.N. Thompson, Chief Engineer of Orange County, “Report for Board of
Supervisors;” Santa Ana Riverside, CA 1937-1939 (ENCL.); box 506; RG 77,
NARA.
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several floods reported, owing to the extensive
development that has taken place since 1862 and
1884. Over large areas in the cities and towns about
30 to 60 percent of the ground surface has been
covered by buildings, paved streets, sidewalks,
etc.37
As the population continued to grow and encroach on the flood
plains of the Santa Ana River basin, it became apparent to officials
that the region needed updated flood control structures. The
ongoing replacement of temporary wooden bridges, like those lost
in 1916, had to change. Not necessarily because of the monetary
loss, but the various counties’ increasing populations could no
longer afford to lose crucial transportation infrastructure.38 This
was especially relevant since America’s infatuation with the
automobile began to materialize. As a result, the need to control
unpredictable floods became much greater than before. Temporary
wooden bridges would not suffice in the wake of the 1916 flood,
which according to Army Corps “forced the thickly populated
communities into quite serious circumstances.”39 Natural water
channels proved too challenging to control. When floods occurred,
water overflowed its natural channels and created a new path to
reach the ocean. For the cities located in the Santa Ana River
basin to further develop, the necessity of carefully engineered
flood control devices was required. A comprehensive approach to
manage a multi-county problem fell to the hands of the Army
Corps of Engineers.
Under the 1936 Flood Control Act, Congress authorized the
Army Corps of Engineers to take charge in surveying and
developing flood control projects. Before Congress appropriated
money to the Santa Ana River basin, the Army Corps had to
survey the land, suggest improvements, and analyze the region’s
37
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economy and population. Army Corps Los Angeles District
engineer, Major Theodore Wyman Jr. composed a report dated
April 15, 1937 entitled, Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River
and other streams, for the protection of the metropolitan area in
Orange County, Calif., calling for Congressional approval to
allocate funds for improvements on the Santa Ana River and its
tributaries.40 Wyman asserted that his report was, “…submitted as
a basis for consideration of plans for flood control works for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, California
authorized by Section 5 of Act of Congress, Public No. 738,
approved June 22, 1936.”41
From this point on, the Army Corps began to build a case
on behalf of those affected by floods on the Santa Ana River basin,
but only for those residents living in Orange County. His report did
not include studies of Riverside or San Bernardino Counties where
the Santa Ana River originates. Initially, Congress must have
singled out Orange County specifically to protect from floods, not
realizing the vast amounts of terrain that contributed to the flood
problem. After investigating the causes of flooding in Orange
County, Major Wyman concluded that the required protection
Orange County (lower basin) needed would not even be located in
the County itself, but upstream in Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties (upper basin).42 Major Wyman immediately broadened
the area of flood control on the Santa Ana River. He argued that in
addition to protecting Orange County it was necessary to consider
the upper Santa Ana River basin, since past floods had caused loss
of life and a significant destruction of property in that area as
well.43 “In the upper basin, bridges have been destroyed, channels
eroded, and debris deposited on the improved areas near the
mountains; in the lower basin in Orange County the greatest
damage has been from overflow, erosion and deposition of debris
on large areas occupied by cities, towns and citrus groves.”44 Thus,
the Army Corps Los Angeles District engineer Major Theodore
Wyman was instrumental in incorporating Riverside and San
40
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Bernardino Counties in a comprehensive plan for flood control
along the entire Santa Ana River.
The Army Corps’ 1937 report proposed that a crucial dam
should be built in the upper basin of the Santa Ana River to protect
Orange County. The Prado Dam became the centerpiece of flood
control along the Santa Ana River and essentially restrained the
mighty river during major storms. First proposed in April 1931 by
Orange County Flood Control District’s general plan for flood
control, the Army Corps of Engineers agreed with the dam’s
location and adopted Orange County Flood Control’s method to
contain floodwaters.45 The 1936 Flood Control Act allotted $13
million for Orange County flood control projects, and the Army
Corps recommended the appropriation of the funds.46 The Prado
Dam would be completed in May 1941 for $9,450,000, as a result
of the 1936 Flood Control Act.47 The remaining money was spent
widening channels. In addition, Chief Engineer Wyman believed
$18,000,000 ($13.2 million federal and $4.6 million local
contribution) was sufficient to establish flood works projects.
However, the various county governments viewed flood control
differently. After Wyman’s report was released (1937) and days
before the March flood, local agencies asserted their belief that
$44,525,600 was required for full protection from the Santa Ana
River and its tributaries above the Prado Dam site in Riverside and
San Bernardino Counties.48 The subsequent flood affirmed for the
local communities the need to suppress the flood menace.
Another interesting aspect the Army Corps’ report
examines is the monetary value of the regions they proposed to
protect. In 1937, were the areas affected by flooding in the Santa
Ana River basin worth protecting? Were they of enough
sustainable value to warrant using federal money to ensure
protection? From 1940 to 1970 the southern California economy
shifted from an agricultural to an industrial base. Population and
45
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property values soared and so did the need to protect them.
According to Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the assessed value of
land to be protected in San Bernardino was estimated at $111
million; the highest of the counties affected by the Santa Ana and
Los Angeles River.49
An important question arises when analyzing the Army
Corps’ reports: what is the correlation between the value of a
county’s land and flood control? Foremost, flood control is for the
protection of the people. A group letter composed by Major
Wyman on January 25, 1938 titled, “Notice of Public Hearing”
held on February 25, 1938 in Riverside, CA reiterates this fact. In
a list of requirements, bullet point “c” states, “The economic and
other justification for the expenditures that may be entailed by the
desired improvements, based upon: Saving of life and protection
to property, improvement to drainage, conservation of water, the
development of power.”50 However, concern eventually shifted
from a strict focus on saving lives and property to other beneficial
factors—for example, how the government might benefit from
investing funds in flood control. At the heart of this argument are
property taxes.
Visualizing the devastation the Santa Ana River basin
experiences periodically, one can obviously see how floods hinder
the government’s ability to prosper. The population in southern
California was growing immensely during this time period and,
therefore, it was presumed the economy of southern California was
experiencing the same level of growth. An investor could see the
increasing prosperity as an investment. The federal government is
the investor and flood control is the investment. Yet, property taxes
create revenue for state and local governments. How, then, does
the federal government benefit from subsidizing flood control? To
elaborate, the basic function of Congress needs to be evaluated.
The framework describing the Legislative Branch’s basic function
may sound elementary, but is critical in order to comprehend the
49
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federal government’s interests in flood control. Congress is
comprised of representatives from within a state. The Senate
serves the state as a whole and the House of Representative’s
members serve the individual districts. Representatives have a
vested interest in their district. By protecting areas from the flood
nuisance, property values increase, thus benefiting their district.
Beginning with Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the Army
Corps introduced direct and indirect benefits of flood control that
soon became a major theme in flood control projects. The Corps’
first report to Congress in 1937 briefly mentioned the increase of
land values as a direct benefit of flood control. The Army Corps
realized that if the Santa Ana River was tamed and disastrous
floods occurred less frequently, then property values and property
tax revenue would increase. However, the Army Corps
acknowledged that their investigative role in 1937 was to devise a
flood control plan with $13 million—not analyze the benefits of
flood control. Nevertheless, the report states, “Although a
comparison of economic benefits with economic costs is not
considered necessary, because the works of improvement have
been authorized by Congress, the following is submitted for
purpose of record.”51 The report predicted that after new modern
flood control improvements were completed, Orange County
would experience greater security from flooding, thus increase
property values by $480,000 on average per year.52 Furthermore,
the report mentions a crucial indirect benefit when modern flood
control is implemented for southern California. The 1937 report,
with foresight reads:
In addition to the direct increase in value due to the
removal of the flood menace, there would be an
indirect benefit from additional future
improvements in the area now subject to overflow,
due to change to a higher use. These
51
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changes…would create an increase in taxable
wealth, not otherwise obtainable. No estimates
have been made of the value of such indirect
benefits.53
Unbeknownst to Major Wyman, California’s growth would
continue to multiply decade after decade nearly doubling between
1950 and 1970.54 When the report was written just prior to the
1940 census, California’s population stood slightly under 7
million; according to the 2000 census California’s population
reached almost 34 million residents.55 Today, California’s
economy is ranked 8th in the world, which directly relates to the
diversely skilled population.56 There is a direct correlation between
California’s economy, flood control, and the ability to support a
growing population. Major Wyman’s report predicted an indirect
benefit between flood control and future developments on the
Santa Ana floodplain. Land that was not usable prior to modern
flood control would be utilized to house residents and support
various businesses, thus creating incredible, taxable wealth. With
hindsight, the 1938 flood changed the perception of flood control
on the Santa Ana River basin. The 1937 report speculated on the
possible damage to the region that could be caused by future floods
of the magnitude of the one in 1916. Their predictions can then be
compared to the outcomes of the 1938 flood.
Floods are evaluated on two criteria: magnitude and
destructiveness. To predict the outcomes of future flooding, both
parts need to be evaluated separately. Historically speaking, the
two conditions are not interlinked. For instance, the 1862 flood
had the largest magnitude of any known documented flooding, yet
the destructiveness was less than that of the 1916 flood, which had
53
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a lesser magnitude. The missing part in this equation is
population. The Army Corps of Engineers needed to analyze all
three factors to calculate damage from future floods. Because of
the intensive development of land on the Santa Ana River basin, a
flood occurring in 1936 could be more destructive and, therefore,
more costly than the 1916 flood, even if of a lesser magnitude.57 In
their calculations, the Army Corps estimated a maximum probable
flood on the Santa Ana River in Orange County of more than twice
the magnitude of the 1916 flood.58
Under time constraints to submit the report, evidence had
yet to be gathered to determine damages for Riverside and San
Bernardino Counties.59 If a flood with the same magnitude as the
1916 flood struck in 1936, the Army Corps estimated the damage
in Orange County would be approximately $4 million.60 In
addition, the hypothetical flood would, without a doubt, cause a
loss of life between 40 to 50 residents of Orange County.61 The
Army Corps’ initial investigation came to a close less than a year
before the 1938 flood. Their estimates of damages from a future
flood in comparison with the magnitude of the 1916 flood doubled
the amount of property damage and caused ten times the loss of
life. The flood experienced by the residents of southern California
and studied by the Army Corps of Engineers forever changed a
region decimated by periodic flooding.
News spread throughout the Santa Ana River basin that the
Army Corps of Engineers had begun a comprehensive
investigation to improve flood control. Local governments and
water districts cooperated with the Army Corps by disclosing any
information the Corps requested. Moreover, local businesses
submitted their perspectives and dilemmas when faced by floods.
For example, in a letter dated February 34, 1938, days before the
March flood, addressed to Chief Engineer Major Wyman,
Pellissier Dairies in Riverside, gave their assessment of how the
Santa Ana River affects the dairy’s operations. Pellissier Dairies
57
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attempted to warn Major Wyman that if another flood like those in
previous years occurred, not only would it result in a loss of life,
but the Santa Ana River, at flood levels, would eat away the
dairy’s property, hurting the business.62
Another business affected by floods in the Santa Ana River
basin was the Italian Vineyard Company located in Guasti, CA.
Guasti is located slightly north of present-day Ontario Airport. In a
letter dated February 24, 1938 the company stated that during
floods, the Santa Ana’s tributaries, which passed through the
property, slowly eroded parts of the vineyard’s immense 5,000acre property.63 The vineyard claimed, “ in order for us to put this
property back in shape it will be necessary that we cut a straight
channel through one hundred sixty (160) acres, putting us to quite
a bit of expense.”64 What the letter fails to say but implies is that
the vineyard wants the Army Corps to appropriate funds to build
the concrete channel with federal money. Moreover, the letter
recommended that the Army Corp not build a concrete channel
from the foothills directly to the Santa Ana River, but to first add a
“spreading area” or catch basin to allow water to sink underground
and be conserved.65
In fact, most of the area’s drinking and irrigation water
came from underground artesian well sources known as aquifers in
the Santa Ana basin.66 M. A. Martinez, General Superintendent of
Italian Vineyards and author of the letter, showed concern that if
the Army Corps decided to build a concrete channel per his
suggestion, water would not have a chance to percolate
underground. Thus, the ability to conserve water in a semi-arid
region would be diminished, as would the agricultural business. In
the region, water is a scarce commodity but also destructive when
floods occur. Since most of the region was agricultural based,
landowners depended on the slow meandering water flow, but
62
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when the Army Corps proposed building channels to expediently
evacuate the water to the Pacific Ocean, “much litigation resulted
from the objections.”67 In summary, the balance between natural
conservation and protective flood control needed to be reached.
The Army Corp of Engineers held a meeting to discuss the
problems arising from these multi-county dilemmas in Riverside
on February 25, 1938, just days before the March flood.
Riverside proved a halfway point for the areas affected by
the Santa Ana River. The public meeting allowed the numerous
water agencies and businesses affected by floods to discuss their
concerns about water rights. In addition, they proposed their
solution for flood control. An Army Corps 1939 report stated:
According to testimony and data presented at the public
hearing:
At Riverside, California, on February 25, 1938,
local interests desire that flood control
improvements combined with improvements for
maximum practicable water conservation be made
in the basin of the Santa Ana River to provide
protection to all localities now exposed to flood
damage. The improvements desired include seven
reservoirs for reduction of flood peaks, and
numerous debris basins, channel improvements,
storm drains, and spreading grounds, the total cost
of which, as estimate by local interests, is
$44,525,600. This cost is based primarily on the
type of structure, which they considered adequate
prior to the March 1938 flood.68
In 1937 Major Wyman believed $18 million would provide
“adequate flood control for the metropolitan area of Orange
County,” but local officials believed the cost to be more than
67
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double the Major’s estimate.69 A week later, the March flood
reaffirmed the local agencies prediction. All three factors
determining the outcome of a flood were put to the test in March
1938: magnitude, population, and destructiveness. The results
were astonishing. The March flood became a wake-up call for
change. The flood forced the Army Corp of Engineers to reexamine how to implement a more powerful system of flood
control. More projects were needed, and therefore stronger support
from the federal government was required.
By March of 1938 preparations for a comprehensive flood
control plan began to take shape. Congress approved eight crucial
projects after Major Wyman’s April 15, 1937 report.70 Days before
the rain began, concerned businesses implored the Army Corps of
Engineers to help limit the potential damage that could be caused
by the Santa Ana River. The Army Corp of Engineers and
Department of Agriculture organized a meeting in Riverside,
February 24, 1938 attended by the counties who had a vested
interest in the Santa Ana River.71 The counties were brought
together to discuss a comprehensive approach to flood control, to
talk about concerns, find solutions, and resolve their differences.
However, the litigious nature of feuding counties over water rights
caused delays in building flood control structures. The various
counties’ flood control agencies had a grander approach to flood
control than the novices at the Army Corps of Engineers, yet it
required the involvement of the Army Corps to put a
comprehensive plan in place. This lack of coordination between
counties was presumably rooted in cross-county suspicions.
Orange County’s fix to the flood lay in Riverside
County—with the construction of Prado Dam—and this caused
anxiety between the two counties. Why would Orange County pay
for a dam not even located in their county? On the other hand,
69
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what purpose would the Prado Dam serve for Riverside County?
The purpose of the dam was to restrict the flow of floodwater by
allowing it to collect behind the dam and then regulate its
discharge into Orange County. Once Federal authorities took
jurisdiction on the matter, disputes between county authorities,
such as the dispute between Orange and Riverside Counties over
the Prado Dam, disappeared. The Army Corps provided the
necessary funds (appropriated by Congress) which neither county
wanted to appropriate for the construction of Prado Dam. Changes
in flood control began slowly, but made progress. On February 27,
1938 rain began to fall over a fearfully concerned region abused by
floods. The resulting March flood would accelerate the
development of flood control.
The Flood
The March flood will be discussed in several different ways. The
first goal is to focus on the basic facts of the storm. The magnitude
of the storm is crucial because it illustrates the intensity needed to
produce a catastrophic flood. The second objective is to analyze
the human impact of the flood vis-à-vis the destruction and loss of
life caused by the flood. The widespread devastation affected
every county in southern California. Newspapers in various states
ran front-page stories, which informed their readers about the
horrors faced by the residents. The March flood demonstrated to
the nation the need to protect the growing state of California.
Finally, the Army Corps studied the flood to see how the Santa
Ana River basin behaves during such events. Their investigation of
the March flood changed the Army Corps’ perspective on flood
control. The original eight project plan proved insufficient for the
Army Corps. A new, extensive investigation began as a result of
the 1938 flood.
Three separate storms brutalized the southern California
landscape beginning February 27 and ending March 3, 1938.
According to the Los Angeles Weather Bureau, the intensity
increased between each storm.72 The greatest recorded rainfall
72
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during the storm period was 32.2 inches at Kelly’s Kamp in the
San Gabriel Mountains: 17.55” fell in a 24-hour period.73 In
addition, the average rainfall in the mountain ranges varied
between 20 and 30 inches.74 San Bernardino received 5.47”,
Riverside reported 5.26”, and Anaheim collected 8.63” over the
four-day period.75 The severity of the flood reached its pinnacle on
the last day because a warm tropical air front brought tremendous
rainfall and raised the altitude of snowfall.76 The Santa Ana River
and its tributaries absorbed 56 percent of the mountain and foothill
run-off above the Prado Dam site, raising the water table, but they
reached their breaking point when the final storm unleashed its
power.77 Harold Willis, former president of San Bernardino’s city
Water Board and eyewitness to the March flood at age eleven was
quoted in the local newspaper in 2003 claiming, “We had this cold,
cold winter… the snow stacked up and stacked up. Then we had
this warm rain come in from the south. The snow was like a huge
sponge. It caught all the water and could hold no more, and it
turned to slush and just came right on down.”78 As a result, the
tributaries overflowed and levies breached on the Santa Ana River
causing widespread devastation and loss of life.
The heavily saturated mountains brought down untold
amounts of debris. Debris included, silt, rocks, and foliage, which
covered many parts of the counties. The Lytle Creek community
located on the San Gabriel Mountain side of the Cajon Pass
received incredible damage. A mountain community named after
the tributary, Lytle Creek, washed away 200 cabins tearing the
community apart.79 At the Lytle and City Creek, and Santa Ana
River junction lays the communities of San Bernardino and Colton
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where the flood destroyed between 200 and 300 homes.80 In San
Bernardino County a hundred bridges collapsed and two miles of
railroad track were undermined, crippling the rail system.81 The
flood not only brought quick moving destructive water, but vast
amounts of debris that adversely affected the communities. The
Army Corps gathered hundreds of photos of the Santa Ana River
and tributaries flooding devastation and compiled them in a report
titled “Photographs of Damage from Storm of February 27-March
3, 1938.”82 The photos themselves provide an excellent pictorial
record, capturing the detail and widespread damage incurred by the
March flood.

Figure 5. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
“View of damaged cabins in Lytle Creek below Glenn Ranch, after March 1938
flood.”
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Figure 6. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
“Upstream view of damage in Lytle Canyon at 17.8 miles below Glenn Ranch,
after March 1938 flood.”

Figure 7. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Photo taken 3/3/1938. Merging point of Lytle Creek and Santa Ana around the
City of Colton. Notice the bridge failures.
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Figure 8. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Photo taken 3/3/1938 View from Orange County looking west. Notice the
breach in the levy submerging nearby cities in water.

Figure 9. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Photo taken 3/3/1938. View from Orange County looking west.
Notice the mouth of the Santa Ana River to the top-left.
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Figure 10. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Picture was taken 3/3/1938 by the Army Corps illustrates widespread flooding
over Northern Orange County looking northwest. Notice the flood waters
reflection-covering most of the County.

The 1938 March flood devastated southern California.
These images are just snap-shots of the areas affected by the Santa
Ana River and its tributaries, but the flood’s destructiveness
impacted the Los Angeles community as well. Total damage and
loss of life figures vary depending on which source one examines.
The San Mateo Times headlines on March 4, 1938 read, “Death
Toll Now Near 250.”83 The Nevada State Journal claimed 400
dead on March 6, 1938.84 In recent years the death toll is still
debated. An article appearing in The Press-Enterprise indicates
that the number of dead was at least 175 people, but recognizes
that the “death toll is difficult to pin down.”85 The reporter refers to
Suzie Earp,86 who at the time (2003) was a master’s student at
83
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California State San Bernardino, “it’s hard to know…just how
many people died…’this was the Depression…and a lot of people
were camped out by the river. We don’t have any official
numbers.’”87 In addition, to the above statement another perception
arises to help uncover the reasons why an official death toll was
not sought after. An article written by the Nevada State Journal on
March 6, 1938, about the southern California flood, reveals the
racial attitudes of the time period. The article reads, “The Red
Cross spokesman said: ‘You must realize that most of the dead are
Mexicans, and when one of their race disappears, they are not
likely to report the disappearance.’”88 This quote is a prime
example of racial stereotyping during that era. Therefore, it can be
assumed organizations like the Red Cross may not have fully
investigated the specific total of causalities caused by the flood
because of racial indifference.
Another aspect of flood damage is the monetary costs of
such an event. These numbers too vary depending on the source.
The City of Ontario, CA Risk Management department currently
compiled historical data estimating $78,602,000 in damages and 87
deaths resulted from of the March 1938 flood.89 The Army Corps
of Engineers estimated the direct and indirect damages at
$48,133,278 in 1939. Today (2010) that converts to approximately
$740 million.90 The Army Corps figure of $48 million is twelvetimes greater than their 1936 prediction of $4 million. Even though
the Army Corps calculated their predictions to a 1916 caliber
flood, the 1938 flood was not twelve-times the magnitude (see
figure 3). The numbers vary between the death toll and financial
loss incurred from the March flood. Either way, the storm’s
magnitude and destructiveness changed perceptions on flood
control. This is illustrated in newspapers articles at the time of the
1938 flood.
News of the flood prompted various newspapers to run
headlines informing their readers of the devastation in southern
87
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California. The New Castle News in New Castle, Pennsylvania ran
a front page headline in bold print “CALIFORNIA HIT BY
FLOOD: Estimate 45 Dead As Waters Sweep Over Part Of
State.”91 Freeport Journal-Standard of Freeport, Illinois headline
in bold writing read “FLOOD LOSS MOUNTS IN
CALIFORNIA,” the article describes the number dead or homeless
and the untold millions in damages.92 The natural disaster even
caused social upheaval. For instance, the San Mateo Times on
March 3 ran a headline “L.A. Looting Starts.”93 Then on March 5,
1938 the headline read “L.A. Issues Orders To Shoot Looters.”94
The same article also describes the problems communities like
Riverside had over contaminated water for drinking purposes and
“stagnant, disease-breeding pools” of water.95 Corroborating the
story, The Hayward Review on the same day ran the headline,
“Disease Perils Flood’s Victims: Town’s Drinking Water
Condemned.”96 Communities were isolated due to the flood. The
Santa Fe Railroad traffic came to a halt because either their tracks
washed away or fell victim to landslides, thus cutting off
supplies.97 Means of communication were severed as power lines
gave way. The devastation felt by southern Californians and
reported through various newspapers across the nation informed
readers of the growing problem of the flood menace in southern
California. The need for a modern flood control system, capable of
withstanding floods like that of March 1938, became imperative.
After the March 1938 Flood: A Lesson Learned
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A newspaper in Alberta, Canada, The Lethbridge Herald on March
24, 1938 criticized Los Angeles as having a “lack of flood control”
and moreover argues that; “…monies Los Angeles City and
County will have to find to develop flood control projects to
prevent flood damage in the future!”98 What the article did not say
was that flood control did exist, but was insufficient. The Army
Corps had already began establishing ideas for a comprehensive
flood control system, but in the wake of the March flood they and
other experts realized they had underestimated the extent of
construction projects needed. The Army Corps began to pressure
the federal government to appropriate additional funds for flood
control. On June 28, 1938 Congress modified the Flood Control
Act of 1936 to provide an addition $6,500,000 for a ninth
construction unit that would control floods on the San Antonio and
Chino Creeks.99 Yet, shortly after Congress’s decision the Army
Corps compiled a new report that analyzed the information
gathered from the March flood. Their proposed plan in 1936
proved insufficient. The report reads:
The plan of improvement in the approved project
for San Antonio-Chino Creeks…is the only one in
the Santa Ana River above Prado that is considered
adequate for the flood protection of the areas
subject to damage from floods. The estimates for
all other basin subdivisions considered in this
enclosure are based on the type of structures
considered adequate by local interests prior to the
March 1938 flood. It is evident that these structures
and therefore the respective estimates are
inadequate. A survey will be required to determine
the improvements that should be included in a
comprehensive plan for flood control on the Santa
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Ana River and tributaries, together with estimates of
cost.100
Major Wyman submitted a preliminary report on February 15,
1939, which nearly negated all previous assumptions to provide
adequate flood control. His report explained how the March flood
was a learning lesson for the Army Corps and local water
authorities:
As a result of this flood, local engineers and
interested parties within the basin believe that the
improvements sponsored at the public hearing are
inadequate to provide the desired protection and
that improvements which will provide such
protection would cost considerably more than the
amount estimated [$44,525,600] by them and as
presented at the hearing [February 24, 1938]…
Plans upon which this estimate was based were
prepared by local interests prior to the flood of
March 1938, and as has been explained, local
interests now believe that their original plans would
be inadequate and that the total cost of adequate
improvements would be considerably more than the
amount mentioned above…$69,000,000, it is
believed that most of the improvements desired by
local interests may be warranted.101
However, Major Wyman’s 1936 report “concludes that the
essential features for adequate flood control…can probably be
accomplished within the limits of funds authorized,” $18 million in
total.102 In three years time Major Wyman perspective changed
dramatically. Adequate flood control now “warranted” $69 million
100
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to develop flood control structures for the Santa Ana River basin.
Furthermore, local interests realized their estimates fell short for
adequate flood control. The March 1938 flood demonstrated a
change in attitude toward a modern flood control system. Before
1938, it was clear to the people that a flood problem existed. After
March 1938, it was evident that a serious flood problem existed
that would require tens of millions of dollars to correct.
Subsequently, Congress authorized a multitude of appropriations
under Flood Control Act103 after the March flood.104 In the wake
of another disastrous flood in 1969, Congressman, 33rd District
Jerry Pettis wrote in the Montclair Tribune, “The 1938 flood
triggered the construction of $38,700,000 in federal and local
projects in our country, all designed to prevent a repetition of that
disaster.”105 After the March flood the Army Corps quickly began
surveying the land to find new solutions to prevent another
disaster.
Immediately after the storm the Army Corps thoroughly
investigated the extent of the damages from the March flood.106
They took aerial photos, conducted interviews with property
owners, and wrote field surveys to determine the total damages
caused by the flood in addition to studying how floodwaters
behaved. These surveys are evident in the above photographs of
the March flood. Hundreds of additional photos were part of
Major Wyman’s May 28, 1938 report on the March flood. The
preliminary report by Major Wyman in February 1939 outlines the
direct and indirect damages of the March flood and specifies which
tributary caused what damage. This helped the Army Corps
classify which areas were at the greatest risk of destructive damage
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., 1; Santa Ana
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA.
103
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at the time. The most volatile areas affected by floods were
investigated to find solutions to prevent future devastation.
Another important lesson learned was the behavior of water. A
July 1939 report established a conundrum to southern California’s
flood problem. To control floods, construction of additional
channels and storm drains were needed to prevent flooding in
localized areas. However, these channels allowed water to quickly
flow downstream at concentrated levels, straining levies
downstream in Orange County. When a storm’s intensity hits the
hardest it creates a surge of water funneling downstream, resulting
in overflow or broken levies. In support of improved or concrete
lined channels, they allowed the water to move as one continual
mass, which allowed for a smaller storage capacity. In other
words, concrete channels were useful in some places, but not
others. Upstream dams or reservoirs would collect water even
during intense periods to minimize high concentration
downstream. Prado Dam is a key example.
After the March flood, the Army Corps sought out new
locations for dams or reservoirs. In addition to dams and
reservoirs, spreading grounds would also be utilized. Spreading
grounds are located at both the foothill of a mountain and at the
canyon’s mouth. Their purpose is to disperse water as it flowed
out of the canyon mouth, thus slowing down the water’s velocity.
Moreover, spreading grounds could catch much of the debris that
devastated most of the Santa Ana basin community.107 Also,
spreading grounds allowed water to seep underground, which
helped replenish the aquifer. The picture on the next page is an
example of one spreading ground utilized in the Santa Ana River
basin. In today’s standards, spreading grounds require an
enormous amount of valuable land, but their benefits far outweigh
the disadvantages. Thus, spreading grounds act as a buffer during
intense rain periods and help solve
a variety of problems pertaining to debris, floods, and water
conservation. Dams and reservoirs also became a tool of flood
control.
The solution was not as simple as building a concrete
channel or a single dam as the Army Corps first had intended. A
107

“Flood Control,” July 1939, pp. 57-61; Santa Ana River, CA Flood Control
July 1939 [1/2]; box 160; RG 77, NARA.

134

Adam Scott Miller

study case was required to comprehend how flooding waters
behave. Then the Army Corps could take their findings and
establish a reliable approach for flood control.
Re-modernization
Development of adequate flood control structures is a learning
process. The Army Corps learned tremendously from the March
1938 flood, but their system was not bullet-proof. In other words,
other floods had to occur to put these improvements to the test.
Besides, Army Corps historian Anthony Turhollow states, “LAD
[Los Angeles District Army Corps] and local agencies have barely
kept pace in providing necessary flood control works to protect the
momentous growth of population and industry in southern
California.”108
In January and February of 1969, two large storms
comparable to the March flood struck the region. Depending on
one’s viewpoint, flood control was either a success or a failure.
The City of Ontario Risk Management report claimed the two
floods created the most damage of any previous flood on record.
Damage in San Bernardino County was estimated at $54 million
and caused at least 13 deaths.109 “Nineteen inches of rain fell in
Ontario over a 24-hour period.”110 For historian Anthony
Turhollow, success or failure of flood control does not depend on
the damages and costs of the flood, but how much money was
saved and damage was prevented as a result of flood control.111
“The system more than paid for itself by preventing more than $1.5
billion in flood damages and preventing the loss of many lives.”112
Former Los Angeles County Board Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli
stressed “in 1969 that ’the overall flood control system prevented
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one of the worst catastrophes in the history of Los Angeles
County.’”113
Today, southern Californian’s experience a near worry free
environment as compared to those who lived here in the early part
of the 20th century. Many residents probably never realized that
southern California has a flood problem. Truth be told, we still do
not understand completely. The Army Corps of Engineers and
local water districts are continually improving flood control.
In 1979, the Army Corps realized flood control was
insufficient on the Santa Ana River. The Prado Dam was targeted
for improvement. Increased urbanization downstream and a
stronger understanding of the Santa Ana basin hydrology led the
Army Corps to conclude, “that a greater degree of protection than
the dam now affords is needed.”114 Their recommendations
required raising the dam by 30 feet and increasing the output
release of water from 5,000 to 30,000 c.f.s.115 The work proposed
in 1979 was finally completed in recent years. Another major
project for the Army Corps of Engineers was the Seven Oaks Dam
in Mentone, CA. The dam is located in the foothills at the canyon
opening of the Santa Ana River. Compared to Prado Dam, the
Seven Oaks Dam dwarfs the 1938 flood control centerpiece. The
Mentone Dam was first mentioned as a future construction
endeavor in 1979 and the Army Corps began construction of the
Seven Oaks Dam (Mentone Dam) in September 1995.116 117
Completed in 2000 the Seven Oaks Dam measures 550 feet high
and 2,980 feet across and was built at a cost of $420 million.118
The Seven Oaks Dam became the centerpiece in a renewed effort
to provide greater protection for the Santa Ana basin community.
Almost $1.4 billion was appropriated in 1986 to re-modernize
flood control along the Santa Ana River and its tributaries.119
113
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Is spending an additional $1.4 billion on flood works’
projects justified? Does the cost outweigh the benefits? For those
who remember 1938, the money was well spent. Just as the March
1938 flood illustrated to the Army Corps the dire need for a serious
approach for flood control, the floods of 1969 demonstrated the
constant need for flood control improvements. The solution
became the $1.4 billion program to prevent possible future loss of
life and damage. Anthony Turhollow indicates the same attitude
toward flood control, “Because floods sometimes do not occur for
a number of successive years, the question of the need for a flood
control system is invariably raised. However, when the inevitable
floods do occur, then public appreciation for the foresight of
engineers is openly and gratefully manifested.”120 The benefits of
flood control are not limited to the protection of life and property,
but are indirectly linked to increased wealth and taxes.
Uncovering the Indirect Benefits of Flood Control
Since adopting a proactive approach to flood control after the
March 1938 flood, southern California’s available land use has
spread remarkably. As discussed earlier, Major Theodore Wyman
introduced the direct and indirect benefits of flood control as a side
note in his April 15, 1937 report. After the completion of the
Army Corps proposed projects, to a certain extent floodwaters
could be contained. Colonel R.C. Hunter in a November 1, 1946
report illustrated that the Army Corps shifted its focus to analyzing
benefits of flood control in addition to flood control improvements.
The report reads:
A study of growth in population and of business and
industrial trends indicated that as a result of future
development the total average value of residential,
business, and industrial property in the overflow
zones during the next 50 years, 1947-96, generally
will increase 50 percent and that the total average
value of highway property and public utilities,
including sewers and water systems, generally will
120
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increase 30 percent. Property values were estimated
on the basis of prewar (1940) conditions. Based on
1946 replacement costs, present property values are
estimated to be from 50 to 100 percent greater than
prewar values. The 1940 true value of nonmilitary
property in the principal overflow zones is
estimated at $167,213,000, including $55,864,000
for residential, business, and industrial property,
$68,080.000 for agricultural property.121
Over time, flood control allowed an increase in property values,
and a corresponding rise in property tax revenue. Local
governments, such as the County of San Bernardino, realized the
positive impacts of flood control. A Board of Supervisors meeting
held on December 22, 1947, urged the federal government to
embark on new flood control improvements. By law, local interests
have to fund a portion of flood control improvements. Yet, the
recorded minutes illustrated that the local interests were willing to
contribute their portion of funds to lure Congress to contribute
monies for new channel improvements:
Minutes of the Board of Supervisors of San
Bernardino County acting as ex-officio Board of
Supervisors of San Bernardino County Flood
Control District” meeting held December 22, 1947.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, if the above
described channel improvements be authorized by
the said Congress, then the San Bernardino County
Flood Control District, to the best of its ability, will
assist the Federal Government in undertaking said
flood control improvements by assuming the
following obligations, to-wit:
(1) Those non-Federal contributions, which are
required by Federal laws.
(2) In addition---and in recognition that property
values would be increased by the improvement with
121
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increased utilization of the land protected from
flooding --- and if such payment shall be required
by Congress in authorizing the improvement,
contribute $200,000.00 of the first cost of the
project.122
The crucial part of this document is that it does not state that flood
control improvements are for the protection of the residents;
instead the supervisors recognize the land use and property
benefits only. Then the Board entices Congress to appropriate
funds, because they have already agreed to provide the county’s
financial contribution for flood control. As a hypothetical
question, this type of behavior can also breed corruption in local
governments worthy of investigation. If property values are low
because its location is on a floodplain and local officials knowingly
ask for improvements that will undoubtedly increase property
value, one could buy the land cheaply before the flood control
improvements are made and then later and sell it for a substantial
profit.
Examples of increased land use can be seen throughout
southern California. The City of Yorba Linda is a prime example
of floodplain land that is utilized for residential and business use.
Below is an illustration, using Google Earth, of the current
development that has taken place in the City of Yorba Linda. The
other is a photograph that was taken by the Army Corps during the
March 1938 flood. The two are taken from virtually the same
perspective. Compare the Santa Ana River’s size while in flood
and the land developments that have taken place. Clearly, the
untold wealth Major Wyman noted in his April 1937 report was
discovered. Thus, flood control allowed for future developments
on the floodplain creating an immeasurable amount of wealth.
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Figure 11. Image Captured from Google Earth. City of Yorba Linda as of
2010: Note the Arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge. The blue line marks the path
of the Santa Ana River.

Figure 12. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at
Riverside. Photo taken 3/3/1938. View looking northeast on Santa Ana River.
Note the arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge. Compare the two photos, the size of
the Santa Ana River and permanent developments encroaching on the floodplain
as to agricultural land.
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Conclusion
The question as to whether the region was worth protecting from
flooding might sound superfluous after analyzing flood control on
the Santa Ana River basin. The untold wealth created from
extended land use and the drastic increase in property tax revenue
certainly improved the region. Flood control allowed the region’s
economy to shift from primarily agricultural to industrial. The
defense industry prospered in southern California, bringing with it
skilled workers. In fact because the defense industry was so
critical in southern California flood control became a matter of
national security.123 During World War II, the Cold War, the
Korean War, and Vietnam, the United States relied on southern
California’s defense material and technology output. If a large
flood disrupted the defense industry, it could cripple the U.S.
military and hinder its ability to supply equipment to the troops at
home and abroad.
Of course some criticism arises when discussing flood
control projects. The mere sight of concrete channels and dams
take away from the beauty of the southern California landscape.
Mike Davis’s book, Ecology of Fear, argues that flood control was
a political construct. “The Los Angeles River- the defining
landscape of the nineteenth-century city-was sacrificed for the sake
of emergency work relief, the preservation of industrial land
values, and a temporary abatement of the flood problem.” 124
Moreover, flood control benefited wealthy large landowners who
forced “the natural river into a concrete straitjacket-destroying the
riparian ecology and precluding use of the riverway as a
greenbelt.”125 Inversely, in densely populated, flatland areas such
as Orange County and Los Angeles, unsightly concrete channels
might be the only option to assist water out of the area rapidly. The
debate may still continue today, but after the residents of southern
California and the nation experienced or witnessed the affects of
the March 1938 flood, perceptions changed.
123
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The timing of the March flood was critical. Since the
region’s population was large enough to warrant concern about
flood control, yet was not developed to the size of the 1950’s
California, a national calamity was averted. Had the circumstances
been different, the 1938 flood might have done to southern
California what Hurricane Katrina did to New Orleans in 2005.
The March flood marked a turning point in southern California.
Modern flood control began just before an industrial and
population explosion occurred. Those devastated by the flood may
not agree with such a positive outlook, but future residents should
be made aware of California’s natural flooding occurrences. As
historian Anthony Turhollow wrote, another lesson the March
flood provided was the need for a permanent disaster agency. The
dependence on volunteers became outdated. “Plans for an
emergency relief organization began as a result of the 1938 flood
to cope with sightseers and looters, as well as to provide
emergency aid.”126 Only sporadic flooding occurred in the wake of
the major storm that passed through southern California in January
2010. The most severe images reported on television were a
neighborhood in Long Beach submerged in two feet of water:
enough to cause damage, but nothing compared to prior floods.
If comparing rainfall from the past and superimposing it
on the southern California of today, 2010, one wonders what the
possible outcome might be. The rainfall that caused the 1862 flood
caused insignificant damage, but what if that storm occurred in
today’s vastly developed area? The Army Corp believed in the
1940’s that the structures they built could withstand maximum
probable floods. The flood of 1969 proved their calculations
wrong, which then sparked the construction of the Seven Oaks
Dam and increase of the Prado Dam’s overall height. In the past
decade the Inland Empire has grown tremendously. That growth
has caused numerous housing projects and roads covering the bare
ground with asphalt and concrete, furthermore adding sewers and
storm drains that ultimately empty into the Santa Ana River. Since
severe flooding has not occurred in recent decades, as a result of
flood control developments, the population may not be aware of
126

Office of the Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District General Administrative
files 1935-1950 800.73, box 40; RG 77, NARA.

142

Adam Scott Miller

the potential of major rainstorms. Historians need to educate and
remind the community of the region’s past flood disasters.
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Angeles District Civil Works Projects 1935-1979, Box 508;
Record Group 77; National Archives Pacific Region,
Riverside, CA.
Figure 6. Picture 81; Santa Ana River + tribs., CA-1939 (ENCL.)
[1/5]; Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers Los
Angeles District Civil Works Projects 1935-1979, Box 508;
Record Group 77; National Archives Pacific Region,
Riverside, CA.
Figure 7. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of
February 27 to March 3, 1938 Above Prado Dam Site,
photo 19A; LA 800.73 Storm Damage (Photos) 15; Box 40,
RG 77, NARA.
Figure 8. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of
February 27 to March 3, 1938 Below Prado Dam Site; LA
800.73 Storm Damage (Photos) 14 [1/2]; Records of the
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Office of the Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District
General Administrative files 1935-1950 800.73, box 40;
Record Group 77; National Archives Pacific Region
Riverside, CA.
Figure 9. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of
February 27 to March 3, 1938 Below Prado Dam Site,
photo 52; LA 800.73 Storm Damage (Photos) 14 [1/2];
Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers Los
Angeles District General Administrative files 1935-1950
800.73, box 40; Record Group 77; National Archives
Pacific Region Riverside, CA.
Figure 10. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of
February 27 to March 3, 1938 Below Prado Dam Site,
photo 57; LA 800.73 Storm Damage (Photos) 14 [1/2];
Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers Los
Angeles District General Administrative files 1935-1950
800.73, box 40; Record Group 77; National Archives
Pacific Region Riverside, CA.
Figure 11. Satellite Image from Google Earth of the City of Yorba
Linda. Accessed May 1, 2010. http://google.earth.com.
Figure 12. Major Theodore Wyman, May 28, 1938, Flood of
February 27 to March 3, 1938 Below Prado Dam Site,
photo 104; LA 800.73 Storm Damage (Photos) 14 [2/2];
Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers Los
Angeles District General Administrative files 1935-1950
800.73, box 40; Record Group 77; National Archives
Pacific Region Riverside, CA.
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